This paper discusses the adequacy of the activities of the Fiscal Investment Loan Program agencies after the fundamental reform in April 2001, which disconnected postal savings and public pension reserves from the FILP. It is found that many ideas of justifying the government interventions to the financial sector have now lost their relevancy. The activity of government financial intermediaries should be streamlined. Among infrastructure construction projects, the most serious part of welfare loss lies on national motorway construction, which is estimated to be about 14.5 trillion yen of welfare loss.
Introduction
The Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP, Zaisei Toyushi) represents a common problem that the Japanese economy faces. A system that has worked very well in a post-war reconstruction period stumbled in the current time. The system has to be changed so that it fits the well-developed market economy.
The FILP is a kind of government interventions to the financial sector. When the financial sector were not well developed, the role of the FILP was significant. However, as the private financial activities has developed, the role of the government is supposed to be scaled down. Actually, the size of the FILP had grown steadily. Table 1 With these reforms, the FILP will enter a new ear of its business, and the landscape of research on the FILP has dramatically changed. While there are many important studies on the former scheme of the FILP, an attempt to reexamine the role and performance of the post-reform FILP scheme is very rare. One important exception is Doi and Hoshi (2002) , who estimated that the bad loans of the FILP would cost at least 78.9 trillion yen. While their stunning number reveals the burden already created by the past inappropriate activities of the FILP, the present paper will address how we will suffer from the future inappropriate FILP activities, which is avoidable if we make a wise decision.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the paper outlines the recent reform movements surrounding the FILP, and discusses the underlying economic ideas. 2 Since the FILP in the current time has grown excessively, downsizing the FILP is a right move. Section 3 discusses reasons of why government interventions to the financial sector are needed. Many ideas of justifying the interventions lost its relevancy under the well-developed financial sector. Remaining relevant reasons are risk bearing of large projects and remedying credit rationing. Based on these observations, the role of government financial institutions will have to be reexamined and streamlined.
Section 4 picks up the expressway construction project of the Japan Highway Public Corporation, which is the largest among agencies engaged in public works. Even with very optimistic assumptions, its future welfare loss is estimated to be more than 14.5 trillion yen. Section 5 poses concluding remarks. (1) Disconnect the postal savings and public pension reserves.
Before the fundamental reform, main financial source of the FILP was postal savings and public pension reserves. The 2001 reform disconnected them from the FILP.
The following two problems motivated this change.
The first was the size of the FILP. The Japanese financial system has achieved a significant progress since the launch of the Trust Fund Bureau. As the private activity is developed, the role of government intervention is likely to be restrained. However, the size of the FILP has actually grown as shown in Table 1 . The growth of postal savings and public pension reserves can be considered as one of reasons of the FILP growth, because the former FILP scheme connected the entrance side and the exit side through the Trust Fund Bureau. Since the Trust Fund Bureau's purchasing Government Bonds works as a buffer, the size of the entrance and exit sides does not necessarily coincide year by year. In the long run, however, the both sides had grown in parallel. Since the FILP agencies and the entrance side of the former FILP have a different policy purpose, there is no guarantee that their optimal sizes are the same. If the growth of the entrance side forces the exit side to follow, FILP agencies become excessively large. The oversized public sector will be engaged in two harmful activities. One is an activity that the private sector can do; the public sector and the private sector thus compete each -4 -other. The other is an inefficient or wasteful activity. By disconnecting postal savings and public pension reserves from the exit side of the FILP, the size of FILP agencies can be determined based on their own policy purposes.
The second problem was that the huge money had flowed inside the government from the entrance side to the exit side. The government determined the FILP interest rates faced by the entrance and exit sides, and there was no guarantee that they track the market interest rate. 
(2) FILP agency bonds
Since the entrance side of the FILP will be no longer a major supplier of funds, the exit side now has to finance money from the capital market. The intensively debated issue in shaping the post-reform FILP scheme was how to finance the funds that FILP agencies need. There are three options. One is the FILP bond, which is a bond that the newly formed Fiscal Loan Fund issues. 5 Since the government backs its redemption, investors think it is equivalent to the Japanese Government Bond. The second option is a government guarantee of loans or bonds. While the safety of the government 3 See Fukao (1998) for further discussion of this issue. 4 Strictly speaking, only new money from postal savings and public pension reserves were disconnected from the FILP. The existing stock of their deposit will remain in the new Fiscal Loan Fund, until the deposit term ends. Therefore, the stock adjustment process will be gradual. In addition, if postal savings and public pension reserves turn new money into the purchase of FILP bonds or Government Bonds, money flow will not change very drastically. Indeed a massive shift of money flows in the capital market did not occur after the 2001 reform. For further discussion of these issues, see Cargill and Yoshino (2001) . 5 The Reform Act nominally abolished the Trust Fund Bureau, and created the Fiscal Loan Fund. But, it effectively only renamed the central part of the FILP, because all assets and liabilities of the old Fund were transferred to the new Fund. guaranteed bonds is the same as the government bond, they pay a small amount of liquidity premium. The last is FILP agency bonds that FILP agencies issue without a government guarantee. Since they contain a default risk, bondholders should monitor FILP agencies carefully. Hoping that FILP agency bonds help to governing FILP agencies, some experts strongly advocated introducing FILP agency bonds.
The 2001 Reform plan suggested that FILP agencies should consider FILP agency bonds first as a way of finance. At the first year of the launch of FILP agencies, however, FILP agencies planned to finance only 3.3 percent of the FILP size (1.1 trillion yen) through FILP agency bonds. The actual finance through FILP agency bonds became even smaller by 100 billion yen than planed. In FY2002 Budget, the amount of FILP agency bonds is expected to be 2.7 trillion yen (10.1 percent of the total FILP plan).
Will the FILP agency bonds indeed help to discipline FILP agencies? A serious problem for the function of the FILP agency bonds is that if the government is expected to bail out a failed FILP agency, the monitoring by bondholders does not work well.
Although the bailout is not explicitly stated, the government may have incentives to bail out a failed FILP agency ex post. No explicit efforts for the government to commit not to bail out have been made. The FILP agency bonds so far get a high rating that is almost equivalent to that of Japanese Government Bond. This fact implies that the market expects an "implicit governmental guarantee." The initial intention of introducing the FILP agency bonds turned out to be less functioning. One type of them is government financial institutions. They make loans to the private sector that is difficult to borrow money from financial markets or private financial intermediaries. 7 The other type of FILP agencies performs public works. 6 For more theoretical discussion of FILP agency bonds, see Iwamoto (1998) . Doi and Hoshi (2002) assessed the first year experience of FILP agency bonds issuance.
7 Targets of government financial institutions are very wide. The Government Housing Loan Corporation lends money to homeowners. National Life Finance Corporation, Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business, and the Shoko Chukin Bank lend money to small and medium-sized businesses. Development Bank of Japan lends money to big projects. Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation specialize in the loan to farmers and fishermen. 8 Major areas of activities are expressway construction (Japan Highway Public Corporation, Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation, Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation), airports (Special Account for Airport Development, New Tokyo International Airport Authority, Kansai International Airport), water supply and sewers (Water Resources Development Public Corporation, Japan Sewage Works Agency) and regional development (Japan Regional Development Corporation) among others. 9 However, in general, the reform of public sector accounting is still behind the trend in other developed countries. Subsidy cost, subsidies, and policy cost are not directly comparable, because they take a different approach to measuring burdens. While the subsidy cost is the discounted present value, the others are annual flow. Policy cost reflects the profitability of operation, but subsidies do not take account of it.
The budget expenses or the policy costs do not necessarily result directly in a social waste if the subsidized activity creates enough social benefits. Moreover, these numbers unfortunately do not capture the possible burdens of the future projects, which may be a significant part of the welfare costs of excessive FILP activities. There are three types of welfare costs of inappropriate FILP projects.
First, when the public sector substitutes the activities of the private sector and operates inefficiently, the inefficiency will be the welfare costs. Although many researchers compared the operation efficiency of government financial institutions with private banks, they did not get secure evidence that the performance of the public sector is inferior (For example, see Yoshino, 1994) . This is perhaps because the private banks operated inefficiently due to the fact that government policies had restrained competition among private institutions.
The second type of welfare costs is a distortion caused by government subsidies. If the government subsidies remedy market failures or some distortions appropriately, they do not bear welfare losses. If the government subsidies are not based on a sound policy purpose, however, resources will be shifted to targeted activities, exceeding an appropriate level. To evaluate this type of deadweight loss, we need to know the adequacy of subsidies and the interest rate elasticity of demand for loans. Since the adequacy of subsidies is very difficult to determine, existing researches did not give us a definite answer.
The third type of welfare costs is money lost by inefficient or inadequate activities such as non-performing loans for government financial institutions and underutilized infrastructure for public works. When the government financial institutions were required to disclose policy costs, the information of non-performing loans was also disclosed. At the end of March 2001, the sum of non-performing loans of 8 government financial institutions amounted to 5.1 trillion yen. The loan loss reserves were 2.1 trillion yen. Doi and Hoshi (2002) pointed out that the government financial institutions did not deduct enough reserves. They estimated that the under-reservation of FILP agencies (including loans made by non-financial institutions) was 3.2 trillion yen.
Underutilized infrastructure can be another serious source of social waste, too. I suspect the most serious part of welfare costs lies on the national motorway (kosoku jidosha kokudo) construction program of the Japan Highway Public Corporation, which will be discussed further in Section 4.
Reforms of Special Public Institutions
The 2001 International Airport Agency, and Kansai International Airport Co.) would be privatized.
Since the FILP does not target private companies directly, a privatization implies a spin-off from the FILP. The plan also determined that among the agencies listed on 
Government Financial Institutions

Six Reasons of the Purpose of Government Interventions to the Financial Sector
The loan made by government financial institutions exceeds more than 20 percent of total loans. To discuss why such a high involvement is needed, this subsection will examine reasons that call for the government interventions in the financial sector. We will review six major reasons that have been pointed out in the existing literature. My assessment is the following; the first four is no longer valid under the well-developed financial system. The last two remain valid. We, therefore, need to reexamine and streamline the current activities of government financial institutions under the new economic conditions.
(1) promotion of competition Due to a heavily regulated environment, the Japanese financial institutions were operated inefficiently. One of the reasons supporting the government financial institutions is that its presence creates a competitive pressure to the private banks. As criticized by Ikeo (1998) , however, a real problem is that the government fails to provide the competitive environment that promotes the efficiency of the private financial sector. Deregulation of the financial sector is a more appropriate policy choice.
(2) production of information
The information production of the financial intermediaries consists of screening (before making a loan) and monitoring (after making a loan). Since government financial institutions do not offer a cashing deposit account, they do not have an advantage of monitoring. It is unconvincing to simply say that government financial institutions have a superior screening ability. Thus the information production role of government financial institutions is severely limited.
One possible exception is the story of Higano (1986) that the former Japan Development Bank 11 created some information because they had a strong tie with the policy makers, particularly, the former Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
This story has lost a relevancy in the current Japanese economy, where the government no longer has advantage of finding leading industries. The role of the Development Bank of Japan is no longer important for the Japanese economy.
(3) asset transformation
Providing long-term funds with a fixed interest rate has been a major purpose of government interventions. When private financial intermediaries cannot change short-term deposits to long-term loans, the government is supposed to be able to bear interest rate risks. However, officials at the Trust Fund Bureau state that they do not bear interest rate risks because they conduct a well functioning Asset Liability Management. 12 If so, the current provision of long-term loans is a result of sophisticated asset management that is manageable also by the private sector. Thus government interventions are unnecessary for this purpose.
(4) externality
When the investment project creates the return that is not collectable by the investor, under-investment of such a project may occur. However, the direct remedy is to give subsidies to such a project. The government sector does not have to be involved further.
(5) risk bearing
The government can bear a very large risk that the private sector cannot, because the government can spread the risk over the whole taxpayers. The FILP thus may be suitable for performing a large project that contains a very large risk. However, we are cautioned that the ability of distributing burdens itself implies that it is very difficult for taxpayers to effectively monitor the risk-bearing behavior of government because a small pain of each taxpayer is not likely to exceed monitoring costs. How to govern the risk bearing of the FILP is a serious issue, which is not yet resolved.
(6) asymmetric information
The credit market is a typical example where a problem of asymmetric information prevails. Even if the government faces the same information constraint with the private sector, there is a possibility that the government can improve welfare (Mankiw, 1986 ).
This story justifies government interventions in the credit market for small businesses, while we lack enough empirical support concerning the current activities of the FILP agencies, like National Life Finance Corporation, Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business, and the Shoko Chukin Bank. 
Why Direct Loans by Government Financial Institutions?
Japanese FILP relies heavily on direct loans. We will examine relative performance among alternative measures of interventions (interest subsidies and loan guarantee).
One role of government financial institutions is to make a loan with the interest rate below the market rate. The gap is financed explicitly through subsidies and implicitly through government guarantee of liabilities. We have to carefully examine whether subsidies to private institutions can do the same job.
Why do we need an institution that is not private? Some incompleteness of contracts is considered to be an answer. 14 When the government writes a contract that completely describes policy purposes, the government can delegate a necessary loan business to a private financial institution. When the policy purpose is very complicated to write down on a contract, a proper execution of public policy becomes difficult. There are also other types of agency problem. Suppose that a government loan program contracts with a private financial institution to do loan business of the program. When the government has a right to decide whether loan should be made, the private institution worries that the proposal of loan will be turned down by the government, and does not devote enough of their resources to the government program. When the government in turn delegates the decision-making of loans to private institutions, there is another possibility of agency problem; they might lend good borrowers their own fund and apply the government program to bad borrowers.
If the resultant inefficiency is serious, the government may prefer to own an 13 Some empirical studies examined whether there are rationing in the credit market. Matsuura, Mitsui and Kitagawa (1991) conducted an empirical test of credit rationing using a test of disequilibrium with an explicit consideration of government financial institutions. They found that while the market of general banking loan is at disequilibrium, the market of small businesses and mortgage is in equilibrium. Since their framework does not focus on the credit market under the absence of government interventions, the role of government interventions cannot be examined. While the asymmetric information story suggests the possibility that the government may play an important role in small business loans, more careful researches would be called for.
14 For general discussion of the choice between a government enterprise and a private firm, see Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) and Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . institution that they can control directly.
15 When these problems are small, the government does not have to rely on a governmental financial institution. Interest subsidies or a loan guarantee can perform a necessary job.
The area where problems of incomplete contract are likely to be small is a mortgage loan. Since a financial intermediary handles a huge number of mortgage loans, the policy purpose cannot depend on individualistic factors. Since the securitization of mortgage has been developed in the United States and other countries, information production and financing can be successfully separated in the area of mortgage loan.
Therefore, the role of Government Housing Loan Company should be shifted to securitize their loans and promote the secondary market for mortgages. The necessity of direct loan has become small.
15 Kaizuka (1981) , Iwata (1988) and Ide and Hayashi (1992) discuss the necessity of direct loan by government financial institutions. kilometers has been opened. 16 Other 2,491 kilometers has been included in the construction plan (Seibi Keikaku), which finishes environment impact assessment.
The Japanese government decided to finance construction costs of these roads by toll revenues, while there has been a small share of subsidies to the construction. Four highway-related agencies borrow construction costs from the FILP, operate toll roads, and repay construction costs by toll revenues. When the first motorway, Meishin line, opened in 1963, its construction costs were expected to be fully repaid in 30 years. In 1972, JH, however, started to pool toll revenues of all national motorways for repaying their debt. Thus, after an old line finished to repay full of its construction costs, it has to contribute to repay debts of newer lines and has never become free.
The current financial conditions of JH appear to be healthy. Since toll revenues However, a hidden problem is that the profitability varies widely among lines. Table   3 presents a measure of the "rate of return" of each line in FY 2000, using the information reported in the Annual Report of JH. The rate of return is obtained as JH has a very idiosyncratic treatment of depreciation allowance and maintenance expenditures. They do not deduct depreciation allowance of roads, but add maintenance expenditures to the book value of roads. The book value of roads in their balance sheet is thus actually the accumulated sum of expenditures on construction and maintenance, measured at the current price.
To evaluate how much the book value differs from the true value, consider the following illustrative example. Suppose 1/N of real construction costs is needed each year to keep the quality of road. Denote the inflation rate by π. The book value of roads built M years ago becomes
where C is real construction costs. As M goes to infinity, the book value converges to C/πN. With 52 of N (when JH was required to prepare the financial statement that adheres the standard of private companies, they set that the lifetime of road is 52 years), the book value becomes lower than the true construction costs (C) if the inflation rate is greater than 1.92 percent. Since the average annual growth rate of the Consumer Price Index between 1963 and 2000 is 4.25 percent, the construction cost is likely to be underestimated. Indeed older lines have a lower book value per kilometer.
Since the purpose of the present analysis is to point out the inefficiency of expressway construction projects, the upward bias upon the rate of return is not fatal for us.
yen of operating surplus. Since JH has these strong cash cows, they can pay the interest of 576 billion yen even after they lose 306 trillion yen to other lines.
Neither solvency nor current profit is a good measure of judging the business of JH.
Two concerns cast doubt on the future financial health of JH. First, since the interest rate is currently very low in Japan, JH enjoys a lighter burden of interest payment.
When the interest rate recovers to a higher level, they will suffer from a large hike of the interest payments. Secondly, the cross-subsidization scheme will not be sustainable, because the share of unprofitable lines will grow steadily.
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Existing Motorways
Whether national motorways are socially useful should be determined by the cost-benefit analysis of the project. According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation, measurable annual user benefits of the current national motorways network are estimated to be around 9 trillion yen. Additional annual benefits from the Seibi Keikaku will be around 2 trillion yen, which is large enough to justify the construction of new expressways.
From the following observations, however, I suspect that their cost-benefit analysis overestimates the user benefit. First, the estimated benefit of toll roads is far larger than the toll revenue. Since a driver choose whether to take an expressway or a free road, the toll fee contains some information about the willingness to pay of marginal users of expressways. Thus the toll revenues become a lower bound of total willingness to pay for highways. If infra-marginal users do not have a quite high willingness to pay, toll revenues would reasonably approximate total willingness to pay. If so, the operating surplus (toll revenues minus operating costs) can be used as a proxy for benefits of expressway users.
The same kind of divergence between toll revenues and calculated benefits can be seen in the Honshu-Shikoku Bridges. Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Agency built 15 big bridges and roads over the Inland Sea of Japan with the construction costs of 2.89 trillion yen. Although the interest payments in FY 2000 were 136.8 billion yen, they earn only 86.5 billion yen of toll revenues, which is too little to repay their debt.
According to the ex post cost-benefit analysis released by the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Agency in December 2000, the present discounted value of benefits is 8.7 trillion yen -17 -and the B/C ratio is 1.7. Since the Japanese government has used 1.5 as a cut-off level of the B/C for road construction, the construction project is not officially proved to be a mistake. The annual flow of user benefit in FY 2000 is about 250 billion yen.
18 If this number is reasonable, why are users reluctant to pay more than 86.5 billion yen as toll fees?
The second observation is that the value of time in the government cost-benefit analysis is derived from the average wage rate of workers reported in the Monthly Labor Survey (Maitsuki Kinro Tokei) by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, and it is currently 38.8 yen per minute. This setting of time value results in an overestimation, firstly because not all passengers are workers, and secondly because not all drives are on business. Thirdly, the value of time used in Japan is roughly more than double of used in other countries.
This paper then provides an alternative form of cost-benefit analysis based on the assumption that what users actually pay reflects the benefit. Suppose an investment project with initial construction costs, C, and the lifetime of capital stock is N years. Let B be the present discounted value of benefit, y the benefit at the initial year, g the growth rate of benefit, r the social discount rate. The benefit-cost ratio becomes 
Since we have to use the book value as a proxy for C, we assume that the lifetime of roads is infinite and that C includes the stream of maintenance expenditures. 19 The Equation (1) becomes
When the "rate of return" in Table 3 is a reasonable approximation of y/C, it can be used for the cost-benefit analysis. Since the Japanese guidelines of cost-benefit analysis recommends 4 percent as the social discount rate, an expressway with the rate of return 18 Since 8.7 trillion yen is the present discounted value of benefits during 40 years from now, the official cost-benefit analysis assumes the future traffic will grow by 3.24 percent per annum on average. 19 Another factor of underestimating C is that the actual data do not contain the future maintenance expenditures. From the same reason as in footnote 17, this bias is not fatal for our purpose. of more than 4 percent is socially desirable if the operating surplus does not grow. 20 Table 3 indicates the overall rate of return of existing lines is 5.19 percent, which is well above the social discount rate practically used in Japan. The present value of welfare gains, B -C, is 8.7 trillion yen. The current lines of national motorway derive net gains to our economy. However, some newer lines exhibit a very low rate of return, which cannot be justified even with the very favorable treatment. Therefore, if we stopped building inefficient lines sometime ago, we could have enjoyed more net benefits by devoting resources into other useful purposes.
Cost-Benefit Analysis of New Construction Projects as a Whole
If JH continues to build an inefficient line, the expressway construction plan would become a huge social waste. Next we will examine the welfare costs of the Seibi Keikaku, which is estimated to spend 22.7 trillion yen to add new 2,491 kilometers into the existing network. There are two main factors that influence the future traffic. First, since many newer 20 As already explained, the current guideline for road construction projects requires that the benefit-cost ratio of an enacted project be greater than 1.5. With g = 0, the ratio of initial benefit to construction costs should be greater than 6.7 percent. Therefore, our criterion is more generous than the official guideline. Another slightly generous treatment of the present analysis is that we accumulate benefits to the infinite future, while the official guideline suggests that only the first 40 years of benefits should be considered.
21 22.7 trillion yen is the author's estimation based on the JH's document that was reported to the Promotion Committee for the Privatization of the Four Highway-related Public Corporations in July 2002. For some lines that are missed from the document, numbers in Annual Report 2001 of JH are used. Since actual costs tended to exceed the planned costs, we are likely to have a conservative estimate of welfare cost.
lines will be built up in a less dense area, the average traffic will decline due to a law of diminishing returns. While more than 100 thousand cars per day drive on expressways in Tokyo, Nagoya and Kansai metropolitan areas, we can easily find in an edge of the network an expressway with the daily traffic of less than 10 thousand cars. Secondly, the aggregate traffic will be affected by macroeconomic activities, demographic conditions, or the shifts of demand for driving a car.
Under the simplified cost-benefit analysis presented in the last subsection, there is a simple relationship between the rate of return and the operating surplus. In order for the rate of return to be 4 percent (the operating surplus is 4 percent of construction costs), operating surplus per kilometer has to be 1.17 times as big as the current level. It is more appealing to connect the rate of return with the traffic. If the toll fee is unchanged, the toll revenues will be proportional to the traffic. We will thus focus on the toll 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of New Construction Projects by Line
Let us consider the effects of diminishing returns by looking at the profitability of is unbelievable that the future traffic will double in these areas, the inefficiency of these lines will not be defeated by any reasonable traffic projections. The total welfare losses of these new lines are estimated to be 14.5 trillion yen, which is about two thirds of the total expenditure. Under the assumption that the toll fee is unchanged, our estimation implies that the traffic per kilometer will decline about by 10 percent due to the construction of new roads with a less busy traffic. Even when we assume the aggregate traffic will grow by a considerable amount, the welfare loss will be inevitable. 23 The future construction of underused national motorways turns out to be a huge welfare loss among FILP projects.
As a sensitivity analysis, I next employ a more optimistic (hardly plausible)
projection. Since revenues and costs of Daini Tomei and Daini Meishin are distinctly larger than those of other lines, I focus on the traffic of these lines and assume that their traffic will be at the same level of existing Tomei and Meishin lines. In this case, the overall rate of return of new lines turns out to be 2.11 percent, which is still far small.
The resulting welfare loss is 10.7 trillion yen, which is 47.2 percent of construction costs.
There is more bad news. National motorways of 2,341 kilometers are not the whole story about the future welfare cost. As explained in the beginning of this section, JH is also building regional motorways of 2,300 kilometers, where the traffic will be much smaller. The national government finances a large part of construction costs of regional motorways with gasoline tax revenues, to help the operation of toll roads sustainable. In our criteria, a dominant part of such subsidies (they do not appear on the financial statement of JH) will result in a social waste. Since JH does not disclose enough information about these lines, unfortunately, it was impossible to conduct the same kind of analysis for these expressways here. 23 The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation released in June 2002 a new projection of total motor traffic of Japan. This projection shows that total traffic will reach a peak in around 2030, when it will be 1.15 times as big as the level of 2000. Although the projection is revised downwards from the previous one, it has been criticized as still too optimistic.
Concluding Remarks
The current scheme of the FILP was shaped in 1951, when the financial markets and private financial intermediaries were not well developed. Since the long-term fund was not provided by the private sector, the government had played an important role in allocating resources in the capital market. At the same time, a quick development of infrastructures was given a high priority. The role of the FILP is considered to fit such a situation that may be typical in developing countries. Unless we believe Japan is still a developing country after 50 years, we have to feel strange that the FILP continues to keep an original style.
We have thus to reexamine what is a suitable way of intervening a developed financial system. The fundamental reform in 2001 was not a final answer. We need another drastic reform of FILP agencies. The reform of special public institutions is effectively the second step of the FILP reform. Although many of FILP agencies are determined to be transformed to an agency, there is a danger that the newly established agency will take over inadequate business of the existing special public institution.
Whether we get an effective reform and a streamlined FILP is now at stake. Doi and Hoshi (2002) revealed that the past inadequate activities of the FILP had created a huge amount of bill to taxpayers. The already created loss is unavoidable.
What is important for the current decision-making is how not to produce a further welfare loss in the future FILP programs. Section 4 picked up expressway construction projects as an example of projects that are likely to be a social waste. The welfare loss of building inefficient national motorways of 2,491 kilometers is estimated to be 14.5 trillion yen, which is about two thirds of construction costs. To avert such kind of welfare loss, we have to conduct further analysis that carefully examines the adequacy of other activities of the FILP agencies.
